This paper analyzes the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school assignment nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a hybrid between the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless still remains in use.
Introduction
In June 2014, more than five hundred parents marched in Taipei, protesting Taiwan's new mechanism for high school placement. Protestors held placards stating, "fill out the preference form for us," and decried admissions as "gambling" (I-chia 2014) . Due to this pressure and calls for his resignation, education minister Chiang Wei-Ling subsequently issued a formal public apology for the new high school assignment system (CNA 2014b) .
What are the protestors complaining about, and why is there so much turmoil associated with Taiwan's new system? To provide insights into this question, this paper analyzes properties of Taiwan's assignment mechanism, a new assignment mechanism (to our knowledge) that represents a hybrid between the widely-studied deferred acceptance and Boston or immediate acceptance mechanisms.
Taiwan, like many other countries and regions, has recently launched a series of reforms to standardize and centralize its secondary school system. At the turn of the century, rising Taiwanese high schoolers took an admissions exam consisting of five subjects. Students submitted their ranking over schools, and those with a higher score choose first. For the next decade, an essay component was added to the admissions exam. Local districts were free to use other performance measures aside from exams (such as Chinese and English, music or sports) and to chose how to convert these measures to a total score.
In 2014, Taiwan passed the Senior-High School Education Act, which established a Comprehensive Assessment Program for Junior High School students. This act changed how each of the five subjects on the admissions exam were scores, placing them into discrete categories: excellent, basic (pass), and needs more work (not pass). To separate high performing students, excellent was further split into A, A+, and A++. During 2014, more than 200,000 pupils took the Comprehensive Assessment Exam and applied to schools in their district of residence.
Aside from changing the admissions criteria, Taiwanese authorities also changed the assignment mechanism, introducing a deduction system. Loosely speaking, in Taiwan's deduction system, a student's admissions score is reduced when a school is ranked lower. Table 1 lists the deduction rule used in several large Taiwanese districts in its first year. In Jibei, where roughly 60,000 students applied in 2014, a student's score at her second choice is reduced by 1, the score at her third choice is reduced by 2, and so on. In Yunlin, no points are deducted for the first four choices, and 2 points are deducted from choices five through eight.
1 This deduction system represents a new class of matching mechanisms, which we term Taiwan mechanisms.
There are many signs that the deduction system is one of the major reasons for nationwide protests. A China Post editorial states (Wei 2014): It is outrageous that the students have to have points deducted from their scores because they fill out the wrong slots; it is because of this that many students with A+ in all subjects eventually have to go to the same school with those who have achieved lower scores.
Despite calls to adopt a system where "students can choose the school they want according to their results" (Wei 2014) , senior Taiwanese leadership has kept the deduction system for the last five years with only slight modifications, shown in Table 2 .
As far as we know, the only other paper to study Taiwan's new system is Hsu (2014) , who studies the new admissions test. Our work is most closely related to Ergin and Sönmez (2006) and Pathak and Sönmez (2008) . Both papers consider the equilibrium of the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism under different assumptions on player sophistication. The results are related because the Taiwan mechanism generalizes aspects of the Boston mechanism. Chen and Kesten (2017)'s study of Chinese college admissions is also related since the permanency-execution period in China is related to deduction. Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) initiated the formal research on the mechanism design approach to student assignment. We refer interested readers to Pathak (2016) for a recent survey of this literature.
In the next section, after introducing the model and formal definitions, we examine the incentive properties of Taiwan mechanisms, showing that they can be compared in terms of manipulation based on a natural ordering on their deduction points. In Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium of the preference revelation game induced by the Taiwan mechanism and compare it with the deferred acceptance algorithm. The last section concludes.
Model

Primitives
In a school choice problem, there is a finite set of students and schools, each with maximum capacity. Each student has a preference over all schools and remaining unassigned, and a priority score at each school.
Formally, a school choice problem includes:
1. students I = {i 1 , ..., i n }, 2. schools S = {s 1 , ..., s m }, 3. capacity vector q = (q s 1 , ..., q sm ), 4. list of strict student preferences P I = (P i 1 , ..., P in ), and 5. list of strict school priority score profiles π = (π s 1 , ..., π sm ).
For any student i, P i is a strict preference relation over S ∪ {∅}, where ∅ denotes being unassigned and sP i ∅ means student i considers school s acceptable.
2 For any student i, let R i denote the "at least as good as" relation induced by P i . We denote the rank of school s under P i with r s (P i ), i.e., r s (P i ) = |{s ∈ S ∪ {∅} : s P i s}| + 1. For any school s, the function π s : {i 1 , . . . , i n } → R is school s's priority score profile such that π s (i) = π s (j) if and only if i = j. We say π s (i) > π s (j) means that student i has higher priority than student j at school s. The priority order of school s over students implied by π s is π s , i.e. i π s j if and only if π s (i) > π s (j). Let π max be the maximum possible score.
We fix the set of students and schools and capacity throughout the paper, so (P, π) denotes a school choice problem. The outcome of a school choice problem is a matching, µ : I → S ∪ {∅}, or a function such that |µ −1 (s)| ≤ q s for any school s ∈ S. µ(i) is the assignment of student i under matching µ. With slight abuse of notation, we use µ(s) instead of µ −1 (s) in the rest of the paper.
A matching µ is Pareto efficient if there is no other matching ν such that ν(i)R i µ(i) for all i ∈ I and ν(j)P j µ(j) for some j ∈ I. A matching µ is individually rational if there is no student i such that ∅P i µ(i). A matching µ is non-wasteful if there is no student-school pair (i, s) such that sP i µ(i) and |µ(s)| < q s . A matching µ is fair if there is no student-school pair (i, s) such that sP i µ(i) and π s (i) > π s (j) for some j ∈ µ(s).
A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational, non-wasteful, and fair. It is wellknown that there exists a stable matching that is weakly preferred to any stable matching by each student (Gale and Shapley 1962) . We refer to this matching as the student-optimal stable matching.
A mechanism, denoted by ϕ, is a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each problem. Let ϕ(P, π) denote the matching selected by ϕ in problem (P, π), ϕ(P, π)(i) denote the assignment of student i, and ϕ(P, π)(s) denote the set of students assigned to school s. We say a mechanism ϕ is Pareto efficient (non-wasteful) [stable] if ϕ(P, π) is Pareto efficient (non-wasteful) [stable] for any (P, π) .
A mechanism ϕ is vulnerable to manipulation in (P, π) if there exists i and P i such that
where P −i = (P j ) j =i . A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if there is no problem for which it is vulnerable to manipulation.
Taiwan Mechanisms
Taiwan mechanisms are a hybrid between the student-proposing deferred acceptance and Boston mechanisms. To define a Taiwan mechanism, we first describe these two mechanisms. Given (P, π), the student-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism computes its outcome as follows:
Step 1: Each student i applies to her best choice, possibly ∅, according to P i . Each school s tentatively accepts the best q s students among all applicants according to π s and rejects the rest.
. . .
Step k: Each student i applies to her best choice which has not rejected her yet, possibly ∅, according to P i . Each school s tentatively accepts the best q s students among all applicants according to π s and rejects the rest.
The algorithm terminates when there are no more rejections. Students are assigned to the choices they have applied in the last step.
Given (P, π), the Boston mechanism (BM) computes its outcome as follows:
Step 1: Each student i applies to her best choice, possibly ∅, according to P i . Each school s permanently accepts the best q s students among all applicants according to π s and rejects the rest. Each accepted student and her assigned seat are removed.
Step k: Each remaining student i applies to her k th choice, possibly ∅, according to P i . Each school s permanently accepts the best students among all applicants according to π s up to the number of its remaining seats and rejects the rest. Each accepted student and her assigned seat are removed.
The algorithm terminates when there are no more rejections.
A Taiwan mechanism can be implemented by deducting points from student priority scores and then applying DA to the resulting problem. Define a deduction rule as λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ |S|+1 ) ∈ R |S|+1 + such that λ 1 = 0 and λ k ≤ λ k+1 for any k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |S|}. For any two deduction rules λ and λ , if λ k ≥ λ k for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |S| + 1} and λ k > λ k for some k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |S|}, then λ > λ .
The Taiwan mechanism associated with deduction rule λ is T M λ . For problem (P, π), the outcome of T M λ is simply DA(P,π λ ) where for each student-school pair (i, s),
When deduction points are zero, the associated Taiwan mechanism produces the same outcome as DA. That is, if λ 1 = (0, 0, ..., 0), then
When deduction points are very large, the Taiwan mechanism produces the same outcome as BM. That is, if λ 2 = (0, π max , 2π max , ..., |S|π max ), then
Since the Taiwan mechanism can be implemented as DA with different inputs, it inherits some properties of DA. Since DA is non-wasteful and individually rational, T M λ (P, π) is non-wasteful and individually rational for any λ and (P, π). Through the deduction rule, Taiwan mechanisms can produce the same outcome as a large number of other mechanisms. Aside from DA and BM, the First Preference First (FPF) mechanisms outlawed in England described by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) are in the class of Taiwan mechanisms if the deduction rule can depend on the school. Since the Chinese Parallel mechanisms described by Chen and Kesten (2017) span the DA and BM extremes, they can also be represented as a Taiwan mechanism.
3
We make two assumptions throughout the rest of the analysis. Since we are motivated by Taiwanese policy developments, we assume that all schools share the same strict priority score profiles.
In Taiwan, student priority score is determined by a combination of measures including test scores. It is the same at all schools in a district. 4 We also assume that there are no ties in the deducted priority scores.
3 In particular, a deduction rule would be related to the permanency-execution period in the Chinese parallel mechanism. If the choices within an execution period all have the same deduction points, and the deduction points in an earlier block are all sufficiently larger than those in a later block, then such a deduction rule produces the same outcome as the Chinese Parallel mechanism. 4 This assumption is consistent with the tie-breaker in use. The Appendix presents two examples showing that our main results do not carry over to the environment where priorities may differ across schools.
Assumption 2. For any preference profile P , there are no ties in the deducted priority after applying the deducted rule λ to the problem (P, π). That is, for all P, s ∈ S,π
To understand the properties of Taiwan mechanisms, consider the following example: Example 1. There are four schools, S = {a, b, c, d}, each with one seat, and four students, i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , and i 4 . The student priority scores for each school s ∈ S are: π s (i 1 ) = 100, π s (i 2 ) = 50, π s (i 3 ) = 11, and π s (i 4 ) = 0. Let π max = 110. The preferences of students are:
Consider two different deduction rules: λ 1 = (0, 41, 45, 51, 51) and λ 2 = (0, 110, 220, 330, 440).
The corresponding adjusted priority ordersπ λ 1 andπ λ 2 are:
The table orders applicants at schools from left to right, so that, e.g.,
Under problem (P, π), the matching produced by DA is:
The matching produced by the Taiwan mechanism with deduction λ 1 , i.e. T M λ 1 , is:
The matching produced by T M λ 2 = BM is:
Comparing Incentives Across Mechanisms
When deduction points are very large, the Taiwan mechanism is equivalent to BM and when deduction points are all zero, it reduces to a serial dictatorship (which is equivalent to DA when school priorities are the same across all schools). A serial dictatorship is a strategy-proof mechanism, while BM is highly manipulable. Does this comparison extend to intermediate values of the deduction rule?
To answer this question, we use the following criteria to compare manipulation possibilities across mechanisms developed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) .
Definition. Mechanism ψ is more manipulable than ϕ if (i) in any (P, π) such that ϕ is vulnerable to manipulation, ψ is also vulnerable to manipulation, and
(ii) there exists some (P, π) such that ψ is vulnerable to manipulation, but ϕ is not.
If we only know that (i) holds and not sure whether (ii) holds or not, then we say that ψ is at least as manipulable as ϕ.
Returning to Example 1, consider deduction rule: 0, 9, 20, 30, 30) . Note that
The adjusted priority ordersπ λ 3 andπ λ 1 are:
The outcome of the Taiwan mechanism with deduction λ 1 is:
If student i 2 instead reports b as her top choice, then she obtains a better outcome than under truth-telling. She has a higher score than i 3 and i 4 underπ λ 1 b when she ranks b as top choice. Under T M λ 1 , student i 1 never applies to school b. Therefore, at school b, student i 2
is not rejected and is assigned to the more preferred school b when she ranks b as top choice.
On the other hand, T M λ 3 produces:
which is the same as DA for (P, π). No student can manipulate T M λ 3 in (P, π).
This example illustrates how the potential for manipulation increases as we increase deduction points. Our first proposition shows the pattern holds in general.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if
Proof. We first show that there exists at least one problem (P, π) such that no student can manipulate T M λ 2 , but some student can manipulate T M λ 1 . Suppose λ
. Let S = {s 1 , ..., sk, ...}, I = {i 1 , ..., ik, ...}, and q s = 1 for all s ∈ S. Student i k has the k th highest score under π. Student i k prefers school s k as top choice for all k <k and student i k prefers ∅ as top choice for all k >k + 1. The preference of ik is:
by ranking sk as top choice but no student can manipulate T M λ 2 .
Next, we show that T M λ 1 is at least as manipulable as T M λ 2 . We present two observations and three lemmas that we use in the proof.
. This follows from the fact that λ k ≤ λ k−1 for any λ.
Observation 2. For any (P, π), there exists a unique stable matching which is the outcome of the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism under π and P . Hence, the unique stable matching is also Pareto efficient.
This follows from the fact that π s = π s for any s, s ∈ S. With slight abuse of notation, we use π(i) instead of π s (i) in the rest of the proof. Lemma 1. For an arbitrary (P, π), let µ be the unique stable matching and ν be another matching such that ν = µ. Then, there exists a student i such that µ(i)P i ν(i) and µ(j) = ν(j) for any student j with π(j) > π(i).
Proof. By Observation 2, µ is Pareto efficient and µ = SD(P, π). Since µ is Pareto efficient, ν = µ implies that there exists a student i such that µ(i )P i ν(i ). Without loss of generality, let i be the student with the highest priority score under π who prefers µ to ν. On the contrary, suppose there exists a student j with π(j) > π(i) and µ(j) = ν(j). Without loss of generality, let j be such a student with the highest priority score under π. Then, ν(j)P j µ(j). However, this contradicts µ being the outcome of the SD and i being the highest-scoring student who prefers µ to ν.
We consider sequential version of DA defined by McVitie and Wilson (1970) where students apply one-at-a-time according to a predetermined order χ and in each step the student who has the highest rank in χ among the ones whose offer has not been tentatively accepted applies.
Lemma 2. For arbitrary (P, π), λ, and order χ, consider any step k of the sequential DA mechanism under (P,π λ ) such that there is only one student i who has not been tentatively accepted by some school in S ∪ {∅}. If school s that i applies to in step k tentatively accepts her offer, then i is assigned to s when the sequential DA terminates.
Proof. Let tk =π λ s (ī) such that studentī applies in stepk of sequential DA to schools. In step k of sequential DA, student i is tentatively accepted by school s if either the number of tentatively accepted students in step k − 1 by s is less than q s or there exists a student j who is tentatively accepted in step k − 1 by s andπ λ s (i) >π λ s (j). If the prior case holds, then the mechanism terminates and the desired result follows. If the later case holds, by Observation 1 and the fact that in each future step at most one student is not tentatively assigned t k <π λ s (i) for any k > k. Therefore, i will not be rejected by s.
Lemma 3. For arbitrary (P, π) and λ, let µ = DA(P, π) = SD(P, π) and ν = T M λ (P, π) = DA(P,π λ ). If µ = ν, then there exists a student who can manipulate T M λ in (P, π).
Proof. First, we define an axiom, known as population monotonicity, that we use throughout the proof. 5 A mechanism ϕ is population monotonic if for any (I, S, q, P, π) after removal of any student i the assignment of all remaining students are (weakly) improved, i.e. ϕ(I \ {i}, S, q, P −i , π|(I \ {i}))(j)R j ϕ(I, S, q, P, π)(j) for all j ∈ I \ {i} where π|(I \ {i}) is the restriction of π on students in I \ {i}. By Lemma 1, there exists a student i such that µ(i)P i ν(i) and µ(j) = ν(j) for any student j with π(j) > π(i). Since T M λ is non-wasteful, there exists a student k such that
Under (P,π λ ), we consider sequential DA for an order χ such that student i is the last student under χ. First note that, when it is i's turn all seats at µ(i) are tentatively filled. Otherwise, i would be matched to µ(i) or better school under ν. By the population monotonicity of (sequential) DA mechanism, when it is i's turn to apply there exists at least one student j who is tentatively accepted by µ(i) and
. This follows from the fact that under the tentative matching attained just before i's turn student k is assigned to weakly better school than ν(k) = µ(i) and when the sequential DA terminates it selects matching ν. Hence, Lemma 2 implies that student i can get µ(i) by ranking it as top choice.
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, let µ be the student optimal stable matching, i.e. µ = SD(P, π) = DA(P, π), and ν 1 and ν 2 be the outcomes of T M λ 1 and T M λ 2 , respectively.
By Lemma 3, if ν 1 = µ, then there exists a student j who can manipulate T M λ 1 .
We consider two more cases. Case 1: ν 1 = ν 2 = µ. Suppose i is assigned school s by manipulating T M λ 2 . For both (P,π λ 1 ) and (P,π λ 2 ), we consider the sequential DA mechanism for an order χ in which i applies last. Letν 1 andν 2 be the tentative allocations obtained just before i's turn for (P,π λ 1 ) and (P,π λ 2 ), respectively. By the fact that ν 1 = ν 2 = µ and Lemma 2 and Observation 1,ν 1 (s ) =ν 2 (s ) = µ(s ) and for all s P i µ(i). Since i can get s by manipulating T M λ 2 , there exists a studentī ∈ν 2 (s) such thatπ
Hence, Lemma 2 implies that i can get s by ranking it as top choice under T M λ 1 .
Case 2: ν 2 = ν 1 = µ. By Proposition 2 (see Section 3.1), ν 1 and ν 2 are Pareto efficient under preference profile P . Hence, there exists at least one student k who prefers ν 2 (k) to ν 1 (k). LetĪ = {i ∈ I|ν 2 (i)P i ν 1 (i)} and k ∈Ī have higher priority score than all other students inĪ, i.e., π(k) > π(j) for each j ∈Ī \ {k}. That is, ν
with π(i) > π(k). Since ν 1 = µ = SD(P, π), there exists at least one studentī such that
s (ī). Then for (P,π λ 1 ), we consider sequential DA mechanism for an order χ in which k applies last. Letν 1 be the tentative allocation obtained just before k's turn for λ 1 . By the fact that ν 1 = µ and Lemma 2,ν 1 (s ) = µ(s ) for all s P k µ(k). Hence, Lemma 2 implies that k can get s by ranking it as top choice under T M λ 1 .
Within the class of Taiwan mechanisms, BM involves large deduction points. 6 Therefore, Proposition 1 implies the following.
Corollary 1. The Boston mechanism is more manipulable than any other Taiwan mechanism.
Proposition 1 relates to a statement of a principal in Tapei who remarked (CNA 2014a):
as long as the deduction system exists, problems can not be solved.
That is, manipulation possibilities are only eliminated when there is zero deduction.
There have been several changes to deduction rules since the system's first year in 2014. Table 2 shows that in most cases, districts have relaxed the deduction rules compared to the first year. For instance, in Gaoxiong, each choice has a weakly smaller deduction in 2015 than in 2014. The two largest districts by number of applications, Jibei and Zhongtou, also changed their deduction rules to reduce deduction amounts. Proposition 1 implies that each of these changes have made the mechanism less manipulable. However, not all changes involve moves to less manipulable mechanisms. For instance, in Jinmen, there were no deductions in 2014, while in 2015 there were deductions for all non-top choices.
Equilibrium Analysis
Characterization
We next analyze the equilibrium properties of Taiwan mechanisms by considering the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous preference revelation game induced by a Taiwan mechanism, or hereafter the Taiwan game.
Following Pathak and Sönmez (2008), we assume there are two types of students. Many families report confusion about the new Taiwanese mechanism, but some have learned about the mechanism's rules. Let N and M denote the set of sincere students and sophisticated students, respectively. For each i ∈ N , the strategy space of student i is {P i }, so i can only submit her true preference. This modeling choice captures the fact that some participants may not understand how deductions change their incentives. For each j ∈ M, student j's strategy space is all strict preferences over schools including being unassigned.
To understand properties of equilibrium, we define the augmented priority scores of sincere and sophisticated students as follows.
Definition. Given a problem (P, π) and deduction rule λ, construct an augmented priority score listπ as:
(i) For each school s, adjust the priority score of each sincere student i ∈ N according tõ π s (i) = π s (i) − λ rs(P i ) (i.e., apply the deduction rule to sincere students for school s)
(ii) For each school s, keep the priority score for each sophisticated student j ∈ M unchangedπ s (j) = π s (j).
In Example 1, the unique Nash equilibrium outcome and the unique stable matching under the augmented priority scores coincide.
Example 1 (cont). Suppose the deduction rule is λ 1 , student i 1 and i 3 are sincere, and student i 2 and i 4 are sophisticated. Students i 1 and i 3 will report abcd∅ and bcda∅, respectively. Independent of the strategies played by the other students, i 1 is assigned school a in any equilibrium outcome. Moreover, student i 2 is assigned school b when she ranks it first and i 3 is assigned school b when i 2 does not rank b first. Hence, in any equilibrium i 2 ranks b first and is assigned b. Similarly, when i 2 ranks b first, student i 4 can be assigned school c by only ranking it first. Hence, there is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome:
The augmented priority orders associated withπ are:
The only stable matching under (P,π) is
which is the same as the Nash equilibrium outcome.
The observation that the Nash equilibrium outcome is related to the stable matching under the augmented priority score holds generally.
We first show that under problem (P,π) there exists a unique stable matching.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any given (P, π), λ, M and N , letπ be the augmented priority score list. Under (P,π), there exists a unique stable matching and it is Pareto efficient.
Proof. By using a recursive procedure, under (P,π), we show that one can always find a student who has the highest priority among the remaining students at her top choice among the remaining schools and we remove that student and a seat from that school. This student will be matched to her top choice among the remaining ones in any stable matching and there will not exist a possible welfare improvement trade between the remaining students and this student.
Let i k be the student who has the highest score in π among the students remaining in Step k ≥ 1 of this procedure. We start with Step 1 in which all students and all seats are available. By our construction, i 1 has the highest priority at her top choice no matter if she is sophisticated or sincere. Moreover, she will be assigned to her top choice in any stable matching, and therefore her welfare cannot be improved by trading with the other students.
We remove i 1 and one seat from her top choice and consider the remaining students and schools in Step 2.
Suppose our claim holds for the first k − 1 steps of this procedure. Now consider Step k. If i k is a sophisticated student, then she has the highest priority among the remaining students at all remaining schools. Hence, the claim holds. Suppose i k is a sincere student. Let s 1 be her top choice among the remaining schools. If the student with the highest priority for s 1 among the remaining ones prefers s 1 most, then we are done. Otherwise, we consider the student i 1 = i k with the highest priority at s 1 among the remaining students and her most preferred school among the remaining ones denoted by s 2 = s 1 . Note that, i k cannot have higher priority than i 1 at school s 2 . If the student with the highest priority for s 2 among the remaining ones prefers s 2 most, then we are done. Otherwise, we consider the student i 2 / ∈ {i 1 , i k } with the highest priority at s 2 among the remaining students and her most preferred school among the remaining ones denoted by s 3 / ∈ {s 1 , s 2 }. Note that, i k and i 1 cannot have higher priority than i 2 at school s 3 . By finiteness, we will eventually find a student i and school s such that i has the highest priority at s among the remaining students and i prefers s most among the remaining schools. Hence, in any stable matching i is assigned to s and there cannot be a welfare improving trade involving student i.
Next, we consider the Taiwan game for deduction rule λ.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any given (P, π), λ, M and N , letπ be the augmented priority score list. Then, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium outcome of this game, which is Pareto efficient and equivalent to DA(P,π).
Proof. By our construction ofπ, when each sophisticated student i ranks DA(P,π)(i) as top choice and each sincere student j plays P j , T M λ selects DA(P,π) and no sophisticated student profitably manipulates. Hence, DA(P,π) is a Nash equilibrium outcome and by Proposition 2, it is Pareto efficient. Since under (P,π) there exists a unique stable matching (by Proposition 2), we will prove that there cannot be a Nash equilibrium outcome which is not stable.
On the contrary, let Q be a Nash equilibrium profile and the outcome of T M λ under this strategy profile is µ, i.e., T M λ (Q, π) = µ, and µ is not stable under (P,π). Note that,
whereπ λ is the implied by (Q, π) and deduction rule λ.
If matching µ is individually irrational, then there exists a student i who is assigned to an unacceptable school, i.e. ∅P i µ(i). Since Q j = P j for each j ∈ N and T M λ is individually rational, i cannot be a sincere student. Then, individual rationality of T M λ implies that ranking ∅ as top choice is a profitable deviation for i. Suppose µ is wasteful or not fair under (P,π). Then, there exists a student-school pair (i, s) such that sP i µ(i) and either |µ(s)| < q s orπ s (i) >π s (j) for some j ∈ µ −1 (s). Under both cases, we consider sequential version of DA under (Q,π λ ) such that i applies last. We first suppose the former case holds. Since Q j = P j for each j ∈ N and T M λ is nonwasteful,
i cannot be a sincere student. Then population monotonicity of DA implies that i can profitably deviate by ranking school s as top choice. Now, we consider the latter case. By our construction, if i ∈ N andπ s (i) >π s (j) thenπ λ s (i) >π λ s (j). Hence, i cannot be sincere. If i is sophisticated, then the fact that DA is population monotonic, the construction ofπ, and the proof of Lemma 2 imply that i can profitably deviate by ranking school s first.
This result shows that the Taiwanese mechanism favors sophisticated students over sincere students, since in equilibrium, deduction only applies to sincere students.
Becoming Sophisticated
What happens to a sincere student who learns the rules of the mechanism? In our example, a student who becomes sophisticated becomes (weakly) better off. If i 3 becomes sophisticated, then the augmented priority orders associated withπ are:
The unique equilibrium outcome when i 2 , i 3 and i 4 are sophisticated is
Hence, by becoming sophisticated, i 3 is better off.
This example illustrates a more general phenomenon summarized by our next proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any given (P, π), λ, M and N , if a sincere student i ∈ N becomes sophisticated, then under the equilibrium outcome of T M λ , i becomes (weakly) better off.
Proof. Suppose thatπ 1 is the augmented priority score profile when i is sincere, andπ 2 is the one when i becomes sophisticated. By definition, for all s ∈ Sπ
That is, i is improved under the associated priority orders when she becomes sophisticated. By Proposition 3, under both cases the unique equilibrium outcome is equivalent to DA(P,π 1 ) and DA(P,π 2 ), respectively. Since, DA respects improvement in priorities (see Balinski and Sönmez (1999) ), DA(P,π 2 )(i)R i DA(P,π 1 )(i).
When one sincere student becomes sophisticated, she obtains a weakly better assignment. Does this imply that other sophisticated students obtain weakly worse assignments? The answer turns out to be negative, as the following example illustrates.
Example 2. There are four schools, S = {a, b, c, d}, each with one seat, and four students, i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , and i 4 . The student priority scores for each school s ∈ S are: π s (i 1 ) = 100, π s (i 2 ) = 50, π s (i 3 ) = 11, and π s (i 4 ) = 0. The preferences of students are: are sophisticated the unique equilibrium outcome is
Therefore, student i 4 is better off after i 2 becomes sophisticated.
Changing Mechanisms
Since the Taiwan mechanism is manipulable, it is natural to compare it to a non-manipulable mechanism. The most natural alternative is the serial dictatorship, a strategy-proof and efficient mechanism. In the setting where each school uses the same score, DA produces the same outcome as a serial dictatorship. The first question we examine is whether sophisticated students prefer the Taiwan mechanism over a serial dictatorship. Policy discussions in Boston about the mechanism centered on the fact some families were exploiting their strategic knowledge to the detriment of families who do not have similar knowledge. Does the same argument apply in Taiwan?
The answer is no: a sophisticated student may in fact prefer DA over the Taiwan mechanism. In Example 2, under a serial dictatorship, we obtain matching
Under the Nash equilibrium where only student i 4 is sophisticated, we obtain matching
Since i 4 prefers d to c, she is worse off under the unique equilibrium of the Taiwan mechanism. We also do not have a clear welfare comparison for sincere students. The next example shows that a sincere student need not be better off under this strategy-proof alternative.
Example 1 (cont.) In Example 1, sincere student i 3 is assigned a more preferred school b under T M λ 1 than school c under the serial dictatorship mechanism.
So why has the Taiwan mechanism persisted for the last five years in the face of massive condemnation and street protests? One reason is that not everyone, even sincere students, would be better off under the strategy-proof alternative. Indeed, this sentiment was expressed by Education Minister Chiang Wei-ling (Wei 2014): no new policy would be carried out unless it would "benefit all students."
Conclusion
A new Taiwanese school assignment has generated widespread turmoil and protests. This paper reports on the incentive properties of this mechanism and characterizes the equilibrium of the induced preference revelation game. Our results show that any mechanism using (nonzero) deduction is manipulable, and that the scope for manipulation increases with the size of deduction. With sincere and sophisticated players, the Taiwanese mechanism has a unique equilibrium, which can be characterized in terms of a stable matching of an alternative economy, where deduction applies to sincere students.
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Next, we show that under Taiwan mechanism without Assumption 1, it is possible for there to be a unique Nash equilibrium outcome in weakly undominated strategies, but that outcome is not stable under augmented priorities. This example slightly modifies the previous one.
Example 4. There are five schools S = {a, b, c, d, e} and six students I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 , i 5 , i 6 }. Let q s = 1 for all s ∈ S. Suppose all students are strategic. The priority scores of students for schools are as follow: π a (i 1 ) = 100, π a (i 3 ) = 99.5, π a (i 4 ) = 97, π b (i 2 ) = 99, π b (i 3 ) = 98.5, π c (i 3 ) = 90, π c (i 4 ) = 86, π c (i 5 ) = 100, π d (i 4 ) = 100, π d (i 5 ) = 90, π e (i 3 ) = 100, and π e (i 6 ) = 99.5. The preference of students are as follows:
We consider the following deduction rule: λ = (0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2). Given λ, π and P , the implied priority scores profile π λ is: π Note that, i 1 and i 2 can obtain their top choices by submitting their true preferences and they may not be assigned to their top choices if they do not rank them as top choice. Hence, in any weakly undominated strategy i 1 and i 2 rank their true top choice at the top. Independent of the other students ranking, student i 4 and i 5 can get one of their top two choices by submitting their true preferences. Moreover, submitting something else is weakly dominated by their true preference profile.
Similarly, if i 6 ranks an unacceptable school at the top she may be assigned to it and ranking ∅ as top choice is weakly dominated by her true preference profile. That is, for all students except i 3 submitting true preference is weakly undominated strategy. For such a strategy profile i 3 's best response is ranking e as top choice. Otherwise she will be unassigned. The corresponding equilibrium outcome is: µ = i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 a b e c d ∅ .
